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This paper analyzes the output, abatement, and investment decisions made by a monopolistic 
polluter under environmental liability law. The model applied considers both integrated and 
end-of-pipe abatement technologies. We find that in the case of fixed technology, in many 
instances negligence produces more favorable results than strict liability in terms of social 
welfare. The reason is that output under strict liability is always less than first-best output, 
whereas output under negligence is not similarly limited. However, this ranking of liability 
rules may be reversed when technology is endogenous. Under such conditions investment in 
both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies under negligence is guided by 
motives foreign to the social planner, whereas the polluter's calculus under strict liability is 
similar to that of the social planner. 
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 1 Introduction
In most discussions about market failure, the various possible causes are dealt with separately.
The distortion under consideration in a particular analysis - externalities or imperfect compe-
tition, for example - is modeled in a setting that is otherwise perfect. Policy recommendations
derived from this kind of analysis aim at a rst-best solution. However, an important branch
of the literature follows a dierent direction. Here, the focus is on the interactions between the
various causes of market failure. The relevant question is to what extent the results of rst-best
analyses and the policy recommendations thus derived carry over to more realistic second-best
settings with multiple causes of market failure. For this paper, the simultaneous existence of
market power and externalities is of particular concern.
In the relevant literature, the monopolistic polluter is an archetypical gure. In his seminal
1969 paper, J.M. Buchanan argued that this economic actor simultaneously causes two kinds
of market failure that tend to balance each other out. In his role as a monopolist, this agent
produces less than the socially optimal output, exploiting the divergence between price and
marginal revenue. In his role as a polluter, he produces too much, ignoring the external side of
his production costs. In the knife-edge case, the two distortions may exactly oset each other
in terms of economic welfare.1 In another important paper, Barnett (1980) established that
under most circumstances the optimal environmental tax is less than the marginal harm when
the polluter is a monopolist. Thus, the traditional Pigouvian policy advice must be adjusted
in the case of a monopolistic polluter.
Since the publication of these two papers, the implications for environmental policy of
pollution generated by rms with market power have been thoroughly analyzed in the literature.
The focus of these analyses has been on emission taxes, transferable discharge permits, and
command and control policy.2 An important environmental policy instrument that has been
overlooked by this literature is environmental liability law. The present paper is an attempt to
1This scenario relies on the assumption that output reduction is the only available means of pollution control.
In the presence of other abatement strategies, the situation becomes more complicated (see Endres 1978, 2011).
2See Requate (2006) for a review of this literature. Other recent contributions in this eld include Boom
and Dijkstra (2009), Kurtyka and Mahenc (2011), Malueg and Yates (2009), Perino (2010), Sanin and Zanaj
(2011), and Schoonbeek and de Vries (2009). A public choice analysis of the monopolistic polluter is provided
by Heijnen and Schoonbeek (2008).
1ll this gap.
We analyze environmental liability law in terms of two alternative liability rules: strict
liability and negligence. Under strict liability, the polluter is required to compensate harm,
irrespective of behavior. Under negligence, the polluter's liability is contingent on a breach of
a behavioral standard. The application of strict liability or negligence in real-world legislation
often depends on the activity in question. For instance, the Environmental Liability Directive
of the European Union lists activities that are subject to strict liability; other activities are
subject to negligence.
Most of the literature on environmental policy uses a static framework. Pollution abate-
ment technology and thus abatement cost functions are assumed to be given. However, the
regulator's choice of environmental policy instruments aects the polluter's choice of environ-
mental abatement technologies a well as the incentives to develop these technologies in the
rst place. This issue is of particular policy relevance. As has been argued by Acemoglu et
al. (forthcoming), among others, it is unlikely that fundamental environmental problems such
as global warming can be solved with the present state of technology. The ability of envi-
ronmental policy instruments to induce environmentally friendly technical progress has been
considered in various settings (see, e.g., Endres 2011, Parry 2003, Requate 2005a, Requate and
Unold 2003, Ulph and Ulph 2007). However, most of these analyses have also been conned to
the consideration of transferable discharge permits, emission taxes, and command and control
regulations. Recently, the range of environmental policy instruments considered in the context
of induced technical change has been extended to environmental liability law (see Endres and
Bertram 2006, Endres et al. 2007, 2008, Endres and Friehe 2011a,b).3
In this paper, we evaluate the performance of environmental liability law in the presence of
a monopolistic polluter according to two criteria. First, we compare the equilibrium pollution
abatement level of a monopolistic polluter with the socially optimal abatement level using the
traditional framework with predetermined technology. Our model allows for two types of pol-
lution abatement technology: end-of-pipe and integrated technology. Abatement equilibria are
dierentiated according to whether they are attained under the rule of strict liability or under
the rule of negligence. Second, we examine the more sophisticated case involving endogenous
3However, these papers are strictly limited to the consideration of perfectly competitive polluters. The
present paper examines policy maker's options in a monopolistic market structure.
2technology. Here, equilibrium investment in technological change by a monopolistic polluter is
compared with socially optimal investment.4 Again, equilibria are derived for the case of neg-
ligence and for the case of strict liability. We establish that negligence will in many instances
outperform strict liability from a social welfare maximization standpoint, given a dened state
of integrated and end-of-pipe technology. This observation follows from the fact that under neg-
ligence rms that abide by the abatement standard no longer bear liability for environmental
harm and therefore choose higher output than under strict liability, whereas the output under
strict liability is clearly excessively constrained. In other words, attainment of the rst-best
outcome is possible only under negligence. However, this ranking of outcomes under the two
rules assumes an exogenous state of integrated and end-of-pipe technology, and may be reversed
once induced technical change of integrated and end-of-pipe technology is taken into account.
This potential reversal follows from the fact that under negligence the standard-obedient rm
is primarily concerned with the eect innovation might have on the behavioral standard and
may thus lack the incentive to invest in integrated abatement technology. In contrast, under
strict liability, the monopolistic polluter's calculus with respect to technical change follows the
same arguments as the policy maker's calculus, albeit evaluated with dierent weights.
In most of the literature, liability law is exclusively investigated in the context of accidents.
Liability in our framework may also be interpreted as an instrument to internalize externalities
from continuous pollution due to production. This is in line with existing legislation, in which
liability is in fact not conned to accidents. Examples include the Environmental Liability
Directive of the EU cited above, which applies to harm irrespective of whether it is caused by
accidents or by continuous pollution, and the German Environmental Liability Act (GELA) of
1991.5 Under the GELA, rms are generally strictly liable for any harm caused by operating
equipment specied in the GELA-Annex. Liability applies to harm from continuous emissions
just as it applies to harm resulting from accidents. Liability under GELA cannot be avoided
when causality is certain. However, importantly, in the case of uncertain causality, the following
procedure comes into play: It is presumed that the rm under consideration caused the harm
4In this paper we assume technical progress to be produced by investment in R&D. An alternative assumption
would be that technical progress is achieved via learning by doing. See Clark et al. (2008) on the economic
theory of these two assumptions and on their practical applications.
5See Endres (2011: 75-80) and Feess (2007: 154-157) for an economic assessment. Both authors examine the
roles of strict liability and negligence for continuous pollution in the context of this law.
3when the rm is (according to the facts of the case) capable of causing the harm in question.
However, the rm can refute this presumption of causality by showing that its facility was
operating in accordance with regulations. Specically, this refers to compliance with the envi-
ronmental requirements imposed by the German Clean Air Act (Bundesemissionsschutzgesetz)
and other regulations derived from this act, such as the Technical Instructions for Clean Air
(TA Luft). Essentially, in the case of uncertain causation, rms are exempt from liability when
they stay within the connes of the environmental standards prescribed by policy makers.6 Our
modeling of the negligence rule is a stylization of this kind of legislation. The environmental
standards dened in command and control regulations are analogous to the due care standard
in the application of liability in accident cases: When a rm violates the norm, it is considered
negligent and is therefore held liable for the harm. When a rm respects the norm, it is exempt
from liability.
Above, we briey alluded to some existing legislation in which liability law is applied to harm
from pollution not generated by accidents. Such circumstances might also have consequences for
future legislation. Consider recent developments in US air pollution control policy:7 Until quite
recently, greenhouse gases (and in particular CO2) were not considered \pollutants" subject
to restriction under the Clean Air Act. However, in December 2009, the US Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) determined that greenhouse gases are dangerous to human health and
the environment. Subsequently, and with the backing of the Supreme Court's decision in Mass.
v. EPA (2007), the EPA began to regulate greenhouse gases (in particular CO2 emissions)
under the Clean Air Act, using the traditional command and control approach. Currently, the
process of regulating stationary sources such as power plants and industrial facilities via the
Clean Air Act is in progress. Now that CO2 and other greenhouse gas emissions have been
determined to generate harm, the question of how to design liability will have to be answered.
As soon as command and control regulations for these emissions are included in the Clean Air
Act, it must be decided whether compliance with these standards will be sucient to absolve
6The idea that the violation of norms imposed by command and control policies is similar to not exercising
due care can be found in many liability laws regarding harm generated by accidents. For example, the US Oil
Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 90) generally protects the defendant in liability cases by capping compensation
payments. However, caps are waived in cases of gross negligence or of violations of applicable regulations,
according to OPA 90, 33 U.S.C. x2704 (c).
7See Burtraw et al. (2011) for a more detailed discussion of these developments.
4CO2-emitting rms from liability. The choice between strict liability and negligence for harm
due to CO2 emissions will thus be on the scholarly and political agenda. Since CO2 emissions are
a by-product of economic activity (and are not only the result of accidents), the interpretation
of liability analyzed in the present paper may also be applied to this forthcoming regulatory
debate.8
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the model. In Section 3,
we consider - given exogenous integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technology - the social
optimum and the private optimum under strict liability and negligence, respectively. Similarly,
in Section 4, we consider - given endogenous integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technology
- the social optimum and private optimum under strict liability and negligence, respectively.
Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
In laying out the framework, we rst examine the model given a xed state of end-of-pipe and
integrated technology. Next, we introduce aspects of the model related to the possibility to
determine the state of the respective technologies.
2.1 The Model with Given Abatement Technology
A monopolistic rm produces output q at marginal production costs normalized to zero. De-
mand for the rm's output can be represented by the inverse demand function P(q), with
P 0(q) < 0  P 00(q). Production causes emissions at level E(q;) = (1   )q, with 1 >   0.
The parameter  represents the state of the integrated abatement technology. The integrated
abatement technology thus directly impacts the emission coecient of output. The monop-
olistic polluter can lower the level of emissions resulting from production at an output level
q by using a level x of end-of-pipe abatement at cost g(x;), @g=@x; @2g=@x2 > 0, where 
represents the state of the end-of-pipe abatement technology. The end-of-pipe technology takes
the emissions created by the rm's activity as given (an example of such technology would be a
8The economic and legal aspects of using liability law to curb CO2 emissions have been analyzed by Faure
and Peeters (2011), who discuss general issues of economic incentives and legal feasibility as well as specic
European and US perspectives on climate change liability.
5scrubber). For simplicity, we assume that the end-of-pipe abatement costs are independent of
output. Industry-specic (or local) net emissions E   x cause environmental harm D(E   x),
where D0; D00 > 0.
2.2 The Model with Endogenous Abatement Technology
We allow for the case in which the state of both types of abatement technology (integrated and
end-of-pipe) can be improved upon. An increase in  decreases end-of-pipe abatement costs
g(x;) with regard to their level at a diminishing rate and at the margin (@g=@ < 0, @2g=@2 >
0, and @2g=@x@ < 0), and will be referred to as an improvement in end-of-pipe abatement
technology. Investment costs associated with state  of end-of-pipe abatement technology are
A(); a marginal improvement comes at cost A0() > 0, which is weakly increasing, A00()  0.
An increase in  denotes an improvement in the emission coecient of the production process
and will be referred to as an improvement in integrated abatement technology. Investment
costs associated with state  of integrated abatement technology are represented by B(); a
marginal improvement comes at cost B0() > 0, which is weakly increasing, B00()  0.
3 Exogenous Abatement Technology
In this section, we assume that the states of both integrated and end-of-pipe technologies are
given exogenously, and we derive the social and the private optimum under strict liability and
negligence, respectively. The next section will detail the socially and privately optimal levels
of investment in integrated and end-of-pipe technology.
3.1 Social Optimum with Given Abatement Technology
We assume that the policy maker maximizes social welfare, dened as the dierence between




P(c)dc   g(x;)   D(E   x) (1)








) = 0: (2)
6Thus, this rst-best level is obtained when marginal end-of-pipe abatement costs are equal to
marginal environmental harm. Socially optimal end-of-pipe abatement increases with the level













@x2 + D00 > 0; (4)
which may be used to dene the following optimal value function:
C(E;) = g(x
(E;);) + D(E   x
(E;)) (5)
this represents minimized social costs of pollution. Naturally, a higher level of emissions implies


























where the second equality uses the rst-order condition for end-of-pipe abatement.9 Since
@x=@E < 1, this establishes that the increase in minimized abatement costs is only a portion
of the increase in minimized social pollution costs (i.e., @c=@E < @C=@E).




P(c)dc   C((1   )q;): (9)








The second-order condition is fullled, as P 0  (1 )2@2C=@E2 < 0. Given that we have nor-
malized marginal production costs to zero, the rst-best output level leads to the equalization
9We assume that @2c=@E2 = D00 @x

@E + D0 @
2x

@E2  0 in order to avoid detailed explanation of the required
assumptions for the third-order derivatives of D and g.
7of the marginal willingness to pay and the marginal increase in the total social pollution costs
due to the increase in output.
Turning to a comparative-statics analysis, it can be established that rst-best output in-
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P 0   (1   )2 @2C
@E2
> 0: (13)
How the state of the integrated abatement technology  inuences the socially optimal level
of end-of-pipe abatement is ambiguous when taking the change of output in (13) into account.
This impact will be determined by how emissions E = (1 )q are inuenced, and the eect
on the level of emissions is decided by two opposing factors. The direct eect of an increase in
 is negative and given by  q, whereas the indirect eect is positive, given by (1 )@q=@.
From (3), it is clear that abatement increases (decreases) when the direct eect is absolutely
smaller (larger) than the indirect eect. From the above, it follows that:
Lemma 1 In the social optimum:
(i) Output q increases with . (ii) Output q increases with . (iii) End-of-pipe abatement
x increases with . (iv) End-of-pipe abatement x increases (decreases) with  if q < (>
)(1   )@q=@.
The level of social welfare attainable by selecting the socially optimal levels of output and





P(c)dc   C((1   )q
;) (14)
and is a function of the exogenous technology parameters (;).
3.2 Equilibrium with Given Technology
In this section, we describe privately optimal decisions under strict liability and under negli-
gence, given the state of both types of technology.
83.2.1 Strict Liability
The monopolistic rm under strict liability maximizes prots with respect to output and the
abatement level, where prots take into account both end-of-pipe abatement costs and envi-
ronmental harm D. Here, we explicitly assume that the monopolistic polluter will denitely be
held responsible for the exact level of harm caused. Using C as dened above, prots may be
stated as a function of output:

SL = P(q)q   C((1   )q;): (15)




0( q) q + P( q)   (1   )
@C((1   ) q;)
@E
= 0: (16)
We assume that the second-order condition is fullled, so that P 00q+2P 0 (1 )2@2C=@E2 < 0.
The output level maximizing prots under strict liability leads to the equalization of marginal
revenue and the marginal increase in social pollution costs due to the increase in output. The
condition demonstrates that privately optimal output will be less than socially optimal output
q. Since this implies lower emissions, this in turn implies that the level of privately optimal
abatement will be less than the level of socially optimal abatement. These considerations allow
us to explicate the following nding:
Proposition 1 Under strict liability:
(i) Monopolistic rms choose a socially suboptimal output level,  q < q. (ii) Monopolistic rms
choose end-of-pipe abatement below the socially optimal level,  x < x. (iii) Monopolistic rms'
abatement mix is distorted towards output reduction.
Proof. Claims (i) and (ii) follow from the arguments in the previous paragraph. Claim (iii)
follows because the monopolistic polluter underestimates the costs from reducing emissions by
reducing the level of output, P 0(q)q + P(q) < P(q).
Regarding Claim (ii), we would like to note that the level x is rst-best from a social
welfare-maximizing standpoint only if output is set equal to q. Consequently, given that the
monopolist's output choice is dierent from q, the abatement level x is no longer rst-best
for the output level selected. More concretely, if  q < q, the policy maker bound by this output
choice would like to induce end-of-pipe abatement below the level x - specically,  x.
9For Claim (iii) in Proposition 1, note that the monopolistic rm's cost for avoiding emissions
via output reduction are equal to the marginal revenue and are thus smaller than the costs
from a social perspective. As we have established that  x < x, we can also argue using (2) that
D0((1   ) q    x) < D0((1   )q   x) must hold, a nding that will later be of relevance.
Lemma 2 Under strict liability:
(i) The privately optimal output  q increases with . (ii) The privately optimal output  q increases
with . (iii) The privately optimal abatement  x increases with . (iv) The privately optimal
abatement  x increases (decreases) with  if  q < (>)(1   )@ q=@.
Proof. When we carry out the comparative-statics analysis regarding the privately optimal
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@E + (1   )@2C
@E2  q
P 00q + 2P 0   (1   )2 @2C
@E2
> 0: (18)
Claim (iii) follows, as privately optimal end-of-pipe abatement is also socially optimal end-
of-pipe abatement when evaluated at  E = (1   ) q. Accordingly, as was true for the social
welfare-maximizing level of abatement, the sign of the derivative of privately optimal end-of-
pipe abatement with respect to an improvement in integrated technology is not clear. Again, it
is critical whether an improvement in the integrated abatement technology implies an increase
or a decrease in the optimized level of emissions, (1   ) q.
By behaving in the privately optimal fashion, a rm will attain a prot of SL = P( q) q  
C((1   ) q;), which is a function of the exogenous technology parameters (;).
3.2.2 Negligence
Under negligence, liability is contingent on the breach of a behavioral duty. In this context,
the behavioral duty is the implementation of a minimum level of end-of-pipe abatement x.
Consequently, we make the realistic assumption that the policy maker will prescribe the use of
some type of ltering, for example, but will refrain from dening a maximum output level.
A legal principle that is frequently invoked when determining such due behavioral standards
is the so-called `Learned Hand rule,' which can be interpreted in our context to require that
10the standard be set to minimize the sum of environmental harm and abatement costs (see,
e.g., Brown 1973, Cooter 1991). We therefore presume that the policy maker will implement a
standard for end-of-pipe abatement set at the abatement level that solves
min
x
SC = g(x;) + D((1   )q   x) (19)
for a given level of output. Our approach is thereby in line with Polinsky and Rogerson (1983),
among others.10 The resulting abatement level is rst-best given the output level and the state
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)q   x
s): (20)

























q . Note that this may be interpreted as the policy maker
responding to a given q, , and  instead of prescribing abatement levels in advance of the
polluter's output decision. Such a structure is realistic, particularly if the policy maker's com-
mitment ability or information regarding technological opportunities is limited. The literature
commonly either assumes ex-post policy design or ex-ante commitment to a certain policy level
(see, e.g., Requate 2005a, b). The sequence of moves tends to codetermine equilibrium behav-
ior. Indeed, it is of central importance for our argument that the abatement standard responds
to variations in the state of both integrated and end-of-pipe abatement technologies, which
applies only in the case of ex-post regulation.






P(q)q   g(x;)   D((1   )q   x) if x < xs
P(q)q   g(x;) if x  xs:
(24)
10Polinsky and Rogerson (1983) compare alternative liability rules in the product-liability context in which
consumers underestimate harm and producers have market power. In their analysis of negligence, it is assumed
that the standard of care minimizes the sum of care costs and expected accident losses.
11For a given level of output, the choice of xs is clearly cost-minimizing for the rm, given
that xs fullls (20). We may thus write prots under negligence as

Njx=xs = P(q)q   c((1   )q;): (25)









The prot-maximizing output is found where marginal revenue is equal to the increase in the
level of minimized abatement costs due to the increase in output. Using @c=@E < @C=@E, it
follows that ~ q >  q. The comparison of ~ q and the rst-best output level q hinges on whether or
not the impact on the marginal benet of output, P 0(~ q)~ q, is absolutely greater than the impact
on the marginal costs of output, (1 )@C=@E (1 @x=@E), where @x=@E < 1. The following
proposition employs the dierence in marginal incentives,
 = P









Proposition 2 Under negligence:
(i) The rm chooses socially suboptimal (excessive) output if  < (>)0. (ii) The rm's abate-
ment mix is distorted towards (away from) output reduction if  < (>)0.
Proof. Follows from the above.






















Choosing activity levels (xs; ~ q) allows a prot level of N = P(~ q)~ q   c((1   )~ q;), which
is a function of the exogenous technology parameters (;).
3.2.3 Comparing Strict Liability and Negligence
By contrasting the private outcome under strict liability with that under negligence, we nd
that negligence may be superior for the following reason: The monopolistic polluter chooses
more end-of-pipe abatement and a higher output level under negligence compared to the levels
chosen under strict liability.
12Corollary 1 (i) The rm chooses an output level ~ q, which is higher under negligence than
under strict liability, ~ q >  q. (ii) The rm chooses the end-of-pipe abatement level xs(~ q), which
is higher under negligence than under strict liability, xs(~ q) > xs( q).
Proof. Claim (i) follows from using @c=@E < @C=@E. Claim (ii) uses the fact that the level
of abatement is socially optimal given the level of the other variables in the two scenarios, but
also the fact that the level of emissions is higher under negligence due to Claim (i).
The levels of output and end-of-pipe abatement under strict liability are certainly too small
(i.e.,  q < q). The rm's output under strict liability is too small due to the fact that the
monopolistic rm is concerned about marginal pollution costs and marginal revenue, which in
this case is distinct from willingness to pay. Negligence removes the burden of environmental
harm and thereby encourages a higher level of output than strict liability (i.e., ~ q >  q). This
level of privately optimal output under negligence may thus be closer to the rst-best level.
Negligence therefore may allow for the attainment of the rst-best outcome, an impossibility
under strict liability. When  q < ~ q  q, negligence will certainly induce higher welfare levels
than strict liability. However, negligence may induce lower welfare levels than strict liability
when  q < q < ~ q, implying that there may be instances in which negligence is inferior to strict
liability in terms of social welfare, should the increased output under negligence be excessively
distorted. The smaller the distortion under strict liability relative to the benchmark and the
smaller the marginal costs that the monopolistic polluter internalizes under negligence, the
more likely the possibility of an adverse impact on social welfare becomes. The smaller the
value of D00, the smaller the marginal costs (as this implies that @xs=@E is smaller).
4 Endogenous Abatement Technology
In this section, we will describe the socially and privately optimal levels of investment in both
integrated and end-of-pipe technology. Here, we interpret decision-making as a sequence of
decisions, in which technology is determined rst, before output and end-of-pipe abatement are
decided upon. The previous section presented decision-making at the second stage; we turn
now to the rst stage.
134.1 Social Optimum with Endogenous Technology
The policy maker maximizes social welfare (i.e., the dierence between consumer surplus and
the sum of end-of-pipe abatement costs and environmental harm), taking into account that end-
of-pipe and integrated abatement technologies can be inuenced at costs A and B, respectively.








P(c)dc   C((1   )q
;)   A()   B(); (28)
where SW (;) gives the maximal level of social welfare without dynamic considerations,
as derived in Section 3 (see (14)). The function W represents the objective function of the
policy maker, including considerations relating to the endogeneity of the state of technology.
An increase in either of the technology parameters impacts the levels of socially optimal output
and abatement. However, in dierentiating, corresponding terms cancel out by application


















) = 0; (30)
where @C=@ = @g=@ < 0 and @C=@E = D0 > 0. The direct eect of an improvement in end-
of-pipe technology on SW  is the decrease in end-of-pipe abatement costs at optimal abatement.
The direct eect of a change in  on SW  is given by the decrease in environmental harm at
optimal output and end-of-pipe abatement, weighted by rst-best output, D0((1 )q x)q.
4.2 Equilibrium with Endogenous Technology
In this section, we describe privately optimal decisions regarding integrated and end-of-pipe
technology under strict liability and under negligence.
144.2.1 Strict Liability
The rm maximizes the level of prots, accounting for the fact that end-of-pipe and integrated
abatement technologies can be inuenced at costs A and B, respectively.
Y =
SL(;)   A()   B()
= P( q) q   C((1   ) q;)   A()   B() (31)
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) q;)
@
  A




@C((1   ) q;)
@E
 q   B
0( ) = 0: (33)
The direct eect of a change in  on SL is given by the decrease in end-of-pipe abatement
costs at privately optimal abatement. The direct eect of a change in  on SL is the decrease
in environmental harm at privately optimal output and end-of-pipe abatement, weighted by
the privately optimal level of output. Consequently, the monopolistic rm makes the same
calculations in weighing the trade-os between the marginal benets and marginal costs of a
marginal improvement in technology as the policy maker does. However, we obtain prot-
maximizing levels of investment deviating from socially optimal investment because the rm
evaluates the functions at dierent variable levels. This explains the following observations:
Proposition 3 Under strict liability:
(i) Monopolistic rms choose a socially suboptimal level of investment in end-of-pipe technology,
  < . (ii) Monopolistic rms choose a socially suboptimal level of investment in integrated
technology,   < .
Proof. The rst claim follows from the fact that j@C((1   ) q;)=@j = j@g( x;)=@j <
j@g(x;)=@j = j@C((1   )q;)=@j, since  x < x and @2g=@x@ < 0. The second claim
follows from the observation emphasized in Section 3.2.1 that D0((1   )q x) > D0((1   ) q 
 x), a relationship which is only pronounced by  q < q in the rst-order conditions determining
privately and socially optimal integrated technology.
The ndings with regard to investment in technology under strict liability are intuitive,
given the prot-maximizing behavior ( q;  x) at the next stage. The monopolistic rm intends to
produce less output and implement less abatement than the policy maker does and therefore
perceives marginal benets from investing to be lower.
154.2.2 Negligence
In the following analysis, we assume that the rm anticipates that the standard regarding end-
of-pipe abatement, xs((1   )q;), which was discussed in some detail in Section 3.2.2, will
adapt as a consequence of changes in the technology parameters.
The rm thus maximizes
Z =
N(;)   A()   B()
= P(~ q)~ q   c((1   )~ q;)   A()   B(): (34)
The following rst-order conditions, which have been simplied by the application of the enve-




@c((1   )~ q;)
@
  A




@c((1   )~ q;)
@E
~ q   B
0  0 (36)
@Z
@
  = 0 (37)
@Z
@
  = 0; (38)
where @c=@ = @g=@x @xs=@ + @g=@, and @c=@E = D0@xs=@ follows from using the rst-
order condition for xs, equation (20).
The condition (35) shows that the polluter will weigh marginal benets (the decrease in
minimized abatement costs) against marginal costs, which include not only the marginal in-
vestment costs but also the fact that the standard will become stricter as a consequence of a
higher , which obviously implies additional abatement costs. In contrast, an increase in 
will lower the abatement standard xs. This fact is the sole incentive for investing in develop-
ment of integrated abatement technology at all. When comparing the private incentives under
negligence to the incentives of the social planner, it is once again important to remember that
@c=@E < @C=@E.
Optimization of the rm's decisions with regard to technology parameters under negligence
allows the following observations:
Proposition 4 Under negligence:
(i) Monopolistic rms choose socially suboptimal investment in end-of-pipe technology for given
16levels of output and abatement, 0 < ~  < . (ii) The monopolistic rm's choice of investment
in end-of-pipe technology is the closer to the rst-best level, the less important the strategic eect
@g=@x @xs=@ is. (iii) Monopolistic rms choose socially suboptimal investment in integrated
technology for given levels of output and abatement, ~  < . (iv) Monopolistic rms that invest
in integrated technology do so only to decrease the abatement standard.
Proof. Follows from the above.
4.2.3 Comparing Strict Liability and Negligence
If we rst turn to a direct comparison of emergent investment levels under strict liability and
under negligence, we obtain
Corollary 2 Monopolistic rms choose lower levels of investment in end-of-pipe and integrated
abatement technology under negligence than under strict liability for given levels of output and
abatement.
Proof. Follows from the above.
When we compare the prot-maximizing levels of investment under strict liability and neg-
ligence to the rst-best levels of integrated and end-of-pipe technology, we nd that under strict
liability the monopolistic polluter assesses marginal benets and marginal costs according to
criteria similar to the policy maker's. In contrast, under negligence technology incentives are
dramatically distorted. Under negligence, the polluter is concerned about the impact that in-
vestment could have on the regulatory standard; with this rule, a prot-maximizing rm may
have no incentive at all to invest in integrated technology. Consequently, although the equilib-
ria under both strict liability and under negligence turn out to be suboptimal compared to the
rst-best pattern and level of investment, the relative distortions created by the two liability
rules dier considerably.
5 Conclusion
The monopolistic polluter has attracted a great deal of attention in the literature on the eco-
nomics of environmental policy. This interest is due to the fact that to some extent the im-
17perfect competition distortion nullies the externality distortion. This interaction could aect
traditional policy recommendations.
This paper contributes by considering the monopolistic polluter under environmental lia-
bility both when technology is exogenous and when it is endogenous. We nd that negligence
will in many instances be preferable to strict liability in terms of social welfare, given exoge-
nous integrated and end-of-pipe technology. This follows from the fact that under negligence,
rms that abide by the abatement standard no longer bear liability for environmental harm
and therefore choose higher output than under strict liability. Indeed, negligence may allow
the rst-best outcome to be attained. However, the welfare ranking of outcomes under the two
liability rules obtained for exogenous integrated and end-of-pipe technology may reverse once
induced development of integrated and end-of-pipe technology is accounted for. This potential
reversal is due to a particular distortion of the incentives to invest in technological change under
negligence. In this case, the private incentive to invest is strongly aected by the inuence that
the polluter's technology choice could exert on the behavioral standard. This may have the
extreme implication that the rm would have no incentive at all to invest in end-of-pipe abate-
ment technology, as this would only increase the level of abatement required in the standard of
negligence. Under strict liability, the monopolistic polluter uses the same logical calculations
as the policy maker, albeit evaluated with dierent priorities.
Our analysis contributes to the economic assessment of the relative performance of strict
liability and negligence as strategies to internalize externalities and to induce socially optimal
technical change. Our ndings also bear important implications with respect to R&D stimu-
lating policies. Under strict liability, incentives for technical change are too little but act in
the right direction; under negligence, polluters may avoid investing in abatement technology
altogether. Consequently, the performance of environmental liability law with respect to induc-
ing advances in abatement technology is inadequate under negligence. This suggests that to
encourage technological progress, it would be necessary to complement liability law with other
policy instruments, particularly when the negligence rule is applied.
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